Neural network robustness has recently been highlighted by the existence of adversarial examples. Many previous works show that the learned networks do not perform well on perturbed test data, and significantly more labeled data is required to achieve adversarially robust generalization. In this paper, we theoretically and empirically show that with just more unlabeled data, we can learn a model with better adversarially robust generalization. The key insight of our results is based on a risk decomposition theorem, in which the expected robust risk is separated into two parts: the stability part which measures the prediction stability in the presence of perturbations, and the accuracy part which evaluates the standard classification accuracy. As the stability part does not depend on any label information, we can optimize this part using unlabeled data. We further prove that for a specific Gaussian mixture problem illustrated by [35] , adversarially robust generalization can be almost as easy as the standard generalization in supervised learning if a sufficiently large amount of unlabeled data is provided. Inspired by the theoretical findings, we propose a new algorithm called PASS by leveraging unlabeled data during adversarial training. We show that in the transductive and semi-supervised settings, PASS achieves higher robust accuracy and defense success rate on the Cifar-10 task.
Introduction
Deep learning [18] , especially deep Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) [19] , has led to state-ofthe-art results spanning many machine learning fields, such as image classification [36, 12, 14, 13] , object detection [33, 32, 21] , semantic segmentation [23, 46, 7] and action recognition [40, 43, 44] .
Despite the great success in numerous applications, recent studies show that deep CNNs are vulnerable to some well-designed input samples named as Adversarial Examples [37, 4] . Take image classification as an example, for almost every commonly used well-performed CNN, attackers are able to construct a small perturbation on an input image. The perturbation is almost imperceptible to humans but can cause a wrong prediction by the model. The problem is serious as some designed adversarial examples can be transferred among different kinds of CNN architectures [30] , which makes it possible to perform black-box attack: an attacker has no access to the model parameters or even architecture, but can still easily fool a machine learning system.
There is a rapidly growing body of work on studying how to obtain a robust neural network model. Most of the successful methods are based on adversarial training [37, 24, 11, 15] . The high-level idea of these works is that during training, we predict the strongest perturbation to each sample against the current model and use the perturbed sample together with the correct label for gradient descent optimization. However, the learned model tends to overfit on the training data and fails to keep robust on unseen testing data. For example, using the state-of-the-art adversarial robust training method [24] , the defense success rate of the learned model on the testing data is below 60% while that on the training data is almost 100%, which indicates that the robustness fails to generalize. Some theoretical results further show that it is challenging to achieve adversarially robust generalization. [10] proves that adversarial examples exist for any classifiers and can be transferred across different models, making it impossible to design network architectures free from adversarial attacks. [35] shows that adversarially robust generalization requires much more labeled data than standard generalization in certain cases. [41] presents an inherent trade-off between accuracy and robust accuracy and argues that the phenomenon comes from the fact that robust classifiers learn different features. Therefore it is hard to reach high robustness for standard training methods.
Given the challenge of the task and previous findings, in this paper, we provide several theoretical and empirical results towards better adversarially robust generalization. In particular, we show that we can learn an adversarially robust model which generalizes well if we have plenty of unlabeled data, and the labeled sample complexity for adversarially robust generalization in [35] can be largely reduced if unlabeled data is used. Intuitively, imagine we hold a model (i.e. a classifier) and a sample. We want to know whether the model's prediction is correct and is robust to the sample. Apparently, the correctness of the prediction can be obtained only if we know the ground truth label. However, to evaluate the robustness, we can add perturbations to the sample and check whether the prediction changes. Since such a way of evaluation does not require any label, we can measure and improve the robustness of the model by leveraging unlabeled data.
First, we formalize the intuition above using the language of generalization theory. The core technique is to decompose the upper bound of the expected robust risk into two terms: a stability term which measures whether the model can output consistent predictions under perturbations, and an accuracy term which evaluates whether the model can make correct predictions on natural samples. Given the stability term does not rely on ground truth labels, unlabeled data can be used to minimize this term and thus improve the generalization ability. Second, we prove that for the Gaussian mixture problem defined in [35] , if unlabeled data can be used, adversarially robust generalization will be almost as easy as the standard generalization in supervised learning (i.e. using the same number of labeled samples under similar conditions). Inspired by the theoretical findings, we think using labeled and unlabeled data together during training is a natural way to learn a model for better adversarially robust generalization. To achieve this, we design a PGD-based Adversarial training algorithm in Semi-Supervised setting (PASS for short). On Cifar-10 task, we show that the PASS algorithm can achieve better performance on adversarially robust generalization.
Our contributions are in three folds.
• In Section 3.2.1, we provide a theorem to show that unlabeled data can be naturally used to improve the expected robust risk in general setting and thus leveraging unlabeled data is a way to improve adversarially robust generalization.
• In Section 3.2.2, we discuss a specific Gaussian mixture problem introduced in [35] . In [35] , the authors proved that in this case, the labeled sample complexity for robust generalization is significantly larger than that for standard generalization. As an extension to this work, we prove that in this case, the labeled sample complexity for robust generalization can be the same as that for standard generalization if we have enough unlabeled data.
• According to our theoretical results, we design an adversarial robust training algorithm using both labeled and unlabeled data. We name our algorithm PASS. Our experimental results show that in the transductive and semi-supervised settings, PASS achieves better performance compared to the baseline algorithms.
Related Works

Adversarial Attacks and Defense
Most previous works study how to attack a neural network model using small perturbations under certain norm constraints, such as l ∞ norm or l 2 norm. For the l ∞ constraint, Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [11] finds a direction to which the perturbation increases the classification loss at an input point to the greatest extent; Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [24] extends FGSM by updating the direction of the attack in an iterative manner and clipping the modifications in the norm range after each iteration. For the l 2 constraint, DeepFool [28] iteratively computes the minimal norm of an adversarial perturbation by linearizing around the input in each iteration. C&W attack [6] is a comprehensive approach that works under both norm constraints. In this work, we focus on learning a robust model to defend the white-box attack, i.e. we assume we are in the worst case that the attacker knows the model parameters and thus can use the algorithms above to attack models.
There are a large number of papers about defending against adversarial attacks, but the result is far from satisfactory. Remarkably, [1] shows most defense methods take advantage of so-called "gradient mask" and provides an attacking method called BPDA to correct the gradients. A recent paper [20] proposes a powerful black-box attack called NAttack, which fools most previous defenses with a high success rate. So far, adversarial training [24] has been the most successful white-box defense algorithm. By modeling the learning problem as a mini-max game between the attacker and defender, the robust model can be trained using iterative optimization methods.
Semi-supervised/Transductive Learning
Using unlabeled data to help the learning process has been proved promising in different applications [31, 45, 9] . Many approaches use regularizers called "soft constraints" to make the model "behave" well on unlabeled data. For example, transductive SVM [16] uses prediction confidence as a soft constraint, and graph-based SSL [3, 38] requires the model to have similar outputs at endpoints of an edge. The most related work to ours is the consistency-based SSL. It uses consistency as a soft constraint, which encourages the model to make consistent predictions on unlabeled data when a small perturbation is added. The consistency metric can be either computed by the model's own predictions, such as the Π model [34] , Temporal Ensembling [17] and Virtual Adversarial Training [25] , or by the predictions of a teacher model, such as the mean teacher model [39] .
Although our method looks similar to those algorithms, it has a totally different starting point and focusing on a different problem. The goal of the consistency-based approach is to improve standard generalization by designing auxiliary regularization on unlabeled data. Most of the works do not have any theoretical guarantees. On the contrary, in our work, we show that the unlabeled data can be naturally used to improve generalization for robust machine learning problems from a theoretical perspective. We derive theoretical bounds, show better sample complexity and design practical algorithms to demonstrate its strength.
Main Results
In this section, we first illustrate the benefits of using unlabeled data for robust generalization from a theoretical perspective. Then we develop a practical algorithm based on the theoretical findings.
Notations and Definitions
We consider a standard classification task with an underlying data distribution P XY over pairs of examples x ∈ R d and corresponding labels y ∈ {1, 2, · · · , K}. Usually P XY is unknown and we can only access to S = {(x 1 , y 1 ), · · · , (x n , y n )} in which (x i , y i ) is independent and identically drawn from P XY , i = 1, 2, · · · , n. For ease of reference, we denote this empirical distribution aŝ P XY (i.e. the uniform distribution over i.i.d. sampled data). We also assume that we are given a suitable loss function l(f (x), y), where f ∈ F is parameterized by θ. The standard loss function is the zero-one loss, i.e. l 0/1 (y , y) = I[y = y]. Due to its discontinuous and non-differentiable nature, surrogate loss functions such as cross-entropy or mean square loss are commonly used during optimization.
Our goal is to find an f ∈ F that minimizes the expected classification risk. Without loss of any generality, our theory is mainly based on the binary classification problem, i.e. K = 2. All theorems below can be easily extended to the multi-class classification problem. For a binary classification problem, the expected classification risk is defined as below. Definition 1. (Expected classification risk). Let P XY be a probability distribution over
We use R(f ) to denote the classification risk under the underlying distribution and useR(f ) to denote the classification risk under the empirical distribution. We use R 0/1 (f ) to denote the risk with the zero-one loss function. The classification risk characterizes whether the model f is accurate. However, we also care about whether f is robust. For example, when input x is an image, we hope a small change (perturbation) to x will not change the prediction of f . To this end, [35] defines expected robust classification risk as below. Definition 2. (Expected robust classification risk). Let P XY be a probability distribution over
Again, we use R B−robust (f ) to denote the expected robust classification risk under the underlying distribution and useR B−robust (f ) to denote the expected robust classification risk under the empirical distribution. We use R 0/1 B−robust (f ) to denote the robust risk with the zero-one loss function. In real practice, the most commonly used setting is the perturbation under -bounded l ∞ norm constraint
For simplicity, we refer to the robustness defined by this perturbation set as ∞ -robustness.
Before presenting our main theoretical results, we briefly introduce the motivation of the work. As we can see from Definition 2, the robust classification risk concerns about whether f can correctly predict the label for all x around x. We notice that testing whether f is robustly accurate or not can be achieved by answering two questions separately: Whether f provides a correct prediction on x, and whether f changes its prediction on any x around x? It is easy to see that f (x) is robustly accurate if and only if the answers to the two questions are Yes. Based on this, we actually decompose the problem into two parts. One part concerns about whether f is accurate and the other part concerns about whether f is robust. Considering the second one (i.e. whether f changes its prediction on any x around x) does not require any label information, we think the robustness can be improved with more unlabeled data.
Robust Generalization Analysis
Our first result (Section 3.2.1) shows that unlabeled data can be used to improve adversarially robust generalization in general setting. Our second result (Section 3.2.2) shows that for a specific learning problem defined on Gaussian mixture model, compared to previous work [35] , the sample complexity of the robust generalization can be significantly reduced by using unlabeled data. Both results suggest that using unlabeled data is a natural way to improve adversarially robust generalization. Due to space limitation, we put all detailed proofs of the theorems and lemmas into appendix.
General Results
In this subsection, we show that the expected robust classification risk can be bounded by the sum of two terms. The first term only depends on the hypothesis space and the unlabeled data, and the second term is a standard PAC bound. Theorem 1. Let F be the hypothesis space. Let S = (x i , y i ) n i=1 be the set of n i.i.d. samples drawn from the underlying distribution P XY . For any function f ∈ F, with probability at least 1 − δ over the random draw of S, we have
, (1) where (1) is a term that can be optimized with only unlabeled data and (2) is the standard PAC generalization bound. P X is the marginal distribution for P XY and Rad S (F) is the empirical Rademacher complexity of hypothesis space F.
From Theorem 1, we can see that the expected robust classification risk is bounded by the sum of two terms: the first term only involves the marginal distribution P X and the second term is the standard PAC generalization error bound. This shows that the expected robust risk minimization can be achieved by jointly optimizing the two terms simultaneously: we can optimize the first term using unlabeled data sampled from P X and optimize the second term using labeled data sampled from P XY , which is the same as the standard supervised learning.
While [8] suggests that in the standard PAC learning scenario (only labeled data is considered), the generalization gap of robust risk can be sometimes uncontrollable by the capacity of hypothesis space F, our results show that we can mitigate this problem by introducing unlabeled data. In fact, our following result shows that with enough unlabeled data, learning a robust model can be almost as easy as learning a standard model.
Learning from Gaussian Mixture Model
The learning problem defined on Gaussian mixture model is illustrated in [35] as an example to show adversarially robust generalization needs much more labeled data compared to standard generalization.
In this subsection, we show that for this specific problem, just using more unlabeled data is enough to achieve adversarially robust generalization. For completeness, we first list the results in [35] and then show our theoretical findings. Definition 3. (Gaussian mixture model [35] ). Let θ * ∈ R d be the per-class mean vector and let σ > 0 be the variance parameter. Then the (θ * , σ)-Gaussian mixture model is defined by the following distribution P XY over (x, y) ∈ R d × {±1}: First, draw a label y ∈ {±1} uniformly at random. Then sample the data point
Given the samples from the distribution defined above, the learning problem is to find a linear classifier to predict label y from x. [35] proved the following sample complexity bound for standard generalization. Theorem 2. (Theorem 4 in [35] ). Let (x, y) be drawn from the (θ , σ)-Gaussian mixture model with
where c is a universal constant. Letŵ ∈ R d be the vectorŵ = y · x. Then with high probability, the expected classification risk of the linear classifier fŵ using 0-1 loss is at most 1%.
Theorem 2 suggests that we can learn a linear classifier with low classification risk (e.g., 1%) even if there is only one labeled data. However, the following theorem shows that for adversarially robust generalization under ∞ perturbation, significantly more labeled data is required. Theorem 3. (Theorem 6 in [35] ). Let g n be any learning algorithm, i.e. a function from n samples to a binary classifier f n . Moreover, let σ = c 1 · d 1/4 , let ≥ 0, and let θ ∈ R d be drawn from N (0, I d ). We also draw n samples from the (θ, σ)-Gaussian mixture model. Then the expected ∞ -robust classification risk of f n using 0-1 loss is at least
As we can see from above theorem, the sample complexity of robust generalization is larger than that of standard generalization by √ d. This shows that for high-dimensional problems, adversarial robustness can provably require a significantly larger number of samples. We provide a new result which shows that the learned model can be robust if there is only one labeled data and sufficiently many unlabeled data. Our theorem is stated as follow:
Then there exists a constant D such that for any d ≥ D, with high probability, the expected ∞ -robust classification risk of fŵ using 0-1 loss is at most 1% when the number of unlabeled data n = Ω(d log d) and ≤ From Theorem 4, we can see that when the number of unlabeled data is significant, we can learn a highly accurate and robust model using only one labeled data. The learning process can be intuitively described as the following three steps: in the first step, we use unlabeled data to estimate the direction of θ * although we do not know the label that θ * (or −θ * ) corresponds to. In the second step, we use the given labeled data to determine the "sign" of θ * with high probability. Finally, we give a good estimation of θ * by combining the two step above and learn a robust classifier. The three key lemmas corresponding to the three steps are listed as below (c i are constants for i = 0, 1, 2, 3). 
Lemma 2. Under the same setting as Theorem 4, suppose v is a unit vector such that v −
Then with probability at least 1 − exp(− Our theoretical findings suggest that we can improve the adversarially robust generalization using unlabeled data, and in the next subsection, we will present a practical algorithm for real applications. Sample a mini-batch of labeled dataŜ L from S L .
4:
Sample a mini-batch of unlabeled dataŜ U from S U .
5:
for each x ∈Ŝ L ∪Ŝ U do
6:
Fix f and attack x with PGD-(k, , δ) on loss L 1 /L 2 to obtain x .
7:
Perform gradient descent on f over the perturbed samples on loss L SSL .
8:
end for 9: end for
} be a set of labeled data and
} be a set of unlabeled data. Motivated by the theory above, to achieve better adversarially robust generalization, we can optimize the classifier to be accurate on S L and robust on S L ∪ S U . This is also equivalent to learn the classifier to be accurate and robust on S L and robust on S U . Therefore, we design two loss terms on S L and S U separately.
For the labeled dataset S L , we use the standard ∞ -robust adversarial training objective function, i.e.,
Following the most common setting, during training, the classifier outputs a probability distribution over categories and is evaluated by cross-entropy loss defined as l CE (f (x), y) = − K k=1 log f k (x)I[y = k], where f k (x) is the output probability for category k. For unlabeled data S U , we use an objective function which measures robustness without ground truth
Putting the two objective functions together, our training loss is defined as a combination of L 1 and L 2 as follows:
Here λ > 0 is a coefficient to trade off the two loss terms. In real practice, we use iterative optimization methods to learn the function f . In the inner loop, we fix the model and use Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) algorithm to learn the attack x for any x. In the outer loop, we use stochastic gradient descent to optimize f on the perturbed x s. We call our algorithm: PGD-based Adversarial training in Semi-Supervised setting PASS. The general training process is shown in Algorithm 1.
Experiments
We use the Cifar-10 task to verify our proposed algorithm. In particular, given a set of labeled and unlabeled data, we study two settings: the transductive setting in which the testing data is the given unlabeled data, and the semi-supervised setting in which the testing data is a set of unseen data during training. All codes and models are available at https://github.com/RuntianZ/ adversarial-robustness-unlabeled.
Experimental Setting
Following [24] , we use the Resnet model and modify the network incorporating wider layers by a factor of 10. This results in a network with five residual units with (16, 160 , 320, 640) filters each. During training, we apply data augmentation including random crops and flips, as well as per image standardization. The initial learning rate is 0.1, and decay by a factor of 10 twice during training.
In the inner loop, we run a 7-step PGD with step size 2 /255 for each mini-batch. The perturbation is constrained to be 8 /255 under l ∞ norm.
Transductive learning setting. In the transductive setting, the algorithm has access to all labeled training data and all unlabeled test data. In the Cifar-10 task, we use the 50k labeled training images as S L and the 10k test images as S U and set λ = 0.125. Each mini-batch contains 100 sampled labeled images and 20 sampled unlabeled images. Learning rate is decayed at the 60 th and the 120 th epoch. We compare our proposed method with several baselines which use labeled training data only, including the original PGD-based adversarial training [24] , thermometer encoding [5] , cascade learning [29] and ADV-BNN [22] .
Semi-supervised learning setting. In the semi-supervised learning setting, the unlabeled data are no longer coming from the test set, hence it is a better way to measure whether more unlabeled data can help adversarially robust generalization. Following many previous works [17, 39, 25 , 2], we sample 5k/10k labeled data from the training set and use them as labeled data. We mask out the labels of the remaining images in the training set and use them as unlabeled data. By doing this, we conduct two semi-supervised learning tasks and call them the 5k/10k experiments. In a mini-batch, we sample 25/50 labeled images and 225/200 unlabeled images for the 5k/10k experiment respectively. In both experiments, we use several different values of λ as an ablation study for this hyperparameter by setting λ = 0.1, 0.2, 0.3. Learning rate is decayed at the 60 th and the 120 th epoch. We use the original PGD-based adversarial training [24] on the sampled 5k/10k labeled data as the baseline algorithm for comparison (referred to as PGD-adv).
Defenses
Attacks Natural FGSM PGD-7 PGD- 
Experimental Results
Transductive learning setting In Table 1 , we report the robust test accuracy of different models using different attack methods in the transductive setting. The attack methods include FGSM [11] , 7-step PGD (referred to as PGD-7), 40-step PGD (referred to as PGD-40), BPDA [1] and NAttack [20] . All attacks are limited to 8 /255 in terms of l ∞ norm. We also report the test accuracy on the original test data (referred to as natural accuracy).
From the table, we can clearly see that PASS in transductive setting is significantly better than all other baselines for more than 30 points under different attacks. Furthermore, the defense success rate of PASS (which is computed by robust accuracy natural accuracy ) is more than 99% under PGD-40 attack which is even stronger than the attack (PGD-7) used during training. This indicates that the model learned from PASS is very robust if it produces a correct prediction. Actually, this experimental result is predictable since the algorithm explicitly imposes regularization on the robustness of the test data.
Natural
Train Accuracy Table 2 : SSL experiment with 5k/10k labeled points (%) Semi-supervised learning setting. We list all results of the 5k/10k experiments in Table 2 . We use five criteria to evaluate the performance of the model: the natural training/test accuracy, the robust training/test accuracy using PGD-7 attack and the defense success rate.
First, we can see that in both experiments, the robust test accuracy is improved when we use unlabeled data. For example, the robust test accuracy of the models trained by PASS with λ = 0.3 for the 5k/10k experiments increase by 3.0/5.0 percents compared to the PGD-adv baselines. We also check the defense success rate which evaluates whether the model is robust given the prediction is correct. As we can see from the last column in Table 2 , the defense success rate of models trained using our proposed method is much higher than the baselines. In particular, the defense success rate of the model trained with λ = 0.3 in the 10k experiment is competitive to the model trained using PGD-adv on the whole dataset. This clearly shows the advantage of our proposed algorithm.
Second, we can also see the influence of the value of λ. The model trained with a larger λ has higher robust accuracy. For example, in the 10k experiment, the robust test accuracy of the model trained with λ = 0.3 is more than 3% better than that with λ = 0.1. However, we observe that training will become hard to converge if λ > 0.5.
VAT [26] uses an adversarial regularization over the unlabeled data but the goal is to improve natural test accuracy. In our experiment, as can be seen from the table, PASS improves robust test accuracy more than natural test accuracy. One of the differences between PASS and VAT is that VAT uses one-step gradient method to attack during training, which is known to be a very weak attack and cannot lead to robust models [24] (more experimental results are provided in the appendix). In our work, we focus on improving network robustness and use a much stronger attack (7-step PGD) during training. For unlabeled data when defending against a weak attack during training, the model can not be learned to be robust but might tend to generalize toward "accuracy"; However, for unlabeled data, when defending against a strong attack during training, the model will be learned to minimize the expected robust risk. Therefore, the model tends to generalize toward "robustness", which is consistent with our theory.
Conclusion
In this paper, we theoretically and empirically show that with just more unlabeled data, we can learn model with better adversarially robust generalization. We first give an expected robust risk decomposition theorem and then show that for a specific learning problem on Gaussian mixture model, the adversarially robust generalization can be almost as easy as standard generalization. Based on these theoretical results, we propose a new algorithm called PASS which leverages unlabeled data during training and empirically show its advantage. As future work, we will study the sample complexity of unlabeled data for broader function classes and solve more challenging real tasks.
According to Definition 2, we have
where (4) is derived from (3). We further use Theorem 5 to bound R(f ). It is easy to verify that with probability at least 1 − δ, for any f ∈ F:
which completes the proof.
C Proof of Theorem 4
For convenience, in this section, we use c i or c i to denote some universal constants, where i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4.
In the proof of Theorem 4, we will use the concentration bound for covariance estimation in [42] . We first introduce the definition of spiked covariance ensemble.
Definition 5. (Spiked covariance ensemble).
A sample x i ∈ R d from the spiked covariance ensemble takes the form x i = √ νξ i θ 0 + w i , where ξ i ∈ R is a zero-mean random variable with unit variance, ν ∈ R is a fixed scalar, θ 0 ∈ R d is a fixed vector and w i ∈ R d is a random vector independent of ξ i , with zero mean and covariance matrix I d .
To see why spiked covariance ensemble model is useful, we note that the Gaussian mixture model is its special case. Specifically, let x U i 's be the unlabeled data in Theorem 4. Then x U i follows the Gaussian mixture distribution
, and
σ is a spiked covariance ensemble with parameter ν = 1 σ 2 , ξ i uniformly distributed on {±1}, w i ∼ N (0, I d ) and θ 0 = θ * .
The following theorem from [42] characterizes the concentration property of spiked covariance ensemble, which we will further use to bound the robust classification error. Intuitively, the theorem says that we can approximately recover θ 0 in the spiked covariance ensemble model using the top eigenvectorθ of the sample covariance matrixΣ. 
Using the theorem above, we can show that for the Gaussian mixture model, one of the top unit eigenvector of the sample covariance matrix is approximately
. In other words, we can approximately recover the parameter θ * up to a sign difference: the principal component analysis ofΣ gives either v or −v, while
Now we have proved that by using the top eigenvector ofΣ, we can recover the θ * up to a sign difference. Next, we will show that it is possible to determine the sign using the labeled data. Lemma 5. Under the same setting as Theorem 4, suppose v ∈ R d is a unit vector such that
Then with probability at least
, and both v and
are unit vectors, we have v θ
Recall that
Moreover, from v −
So, using the Gaussian tail bound P X∼N (0,1) [X ≤ −t] ≤ exp(−t 2 ) for all t ∈ R, and combining with (6), (7), (8), we have
as stated in the lemma.
Armed with Lemma 4 and Lemma 5, we now have a precise estimation of θ * in the Gaussian mixture model. Then, we will show that the high precision of the estimation can be translated to low robust risk. To achieve this, we need a lemma from [35] , which upper bounds the robust classification risk of a linear classifierŵ in terms of its inner product with θ * . Lemma 6 guarantees that if we can estimate θ precisely, we can achieve small robust classification risk. Combine with Lemma 4 and Lemma 5 which provide such estimation, we are now ready to prove the robust classification risk bound stated in Theorem 4. We can actually prove a slightly more general theorem below with some extra parameters, and obtain Theorem 4 as a corollary. Proof. By the choice of v we have (8) holds, i.e.
with probability at least 1 − c 1 e −c2n min{ Applying Lemma 5 to v yields
with probability at least 1 − exp(−
).
Notice thatŵ = sign(y L · v x L )v. So by union bound on events (10) and (11), we have
with probability at least 1 − c 1 e −c2n min{ ).
Since ŵ 2 = 1, we have
By Table 3 : SSL experiment with 5k/10k labeled points (%)
